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VOLUNTEERS ... NOT PROFITEERS: THE
HYDROLEVEL MYTH
William J Curran IH*
The recent Hydrolevel Supreme Court decision' has generated consider-
able notoriety in the national press2 and concern in the business commu-
nity.3 Observers do not understand how the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") could have injured the Hydrolevel Cor-
poration by a surreptitious conspiracy between two corporate ASME vol-
unteers, seemingly beyond its control. The Court made clear, however,
that a conspiracy to misinterpret an ASME product standard by ASME
volunteers was under ASME's auspices, and thus under its direct control.
ASME should not have permitted the rival corporate volunteers to judge
Hydrolevel's product qualifications and should have prevented the fraudu-
lent interpretation. Its failure to control confficts of interest and spurious
interpretations created a dangerous antitrust climate for which the Court
found ASME liable.
The Court's view of ASME's failure to take "systematic steps to make
improper conduct. . . unlikely. . .[and thus to] prevent antitrust viola-
tions"4 has created difficult problems for the nation's many standards-set-
ting organizations. Engineering, professional, and trade organizations
must now guard against the crippling threat of antitrust treble damage lia-
bility by devising controls against conspiratorial conduct. This article will
explain that because the antitrust law of standards is anomalous, effective
* B.S., 1962, J.D., 1965, The Creighton University. Member, Nebraska and New
York Bars.
1. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982).
2. Johnson, Liability in Setting Standards, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1982, at DI, col. 4;
Barbash, Professional, Trade Group Liability Rises, Wash. Post, May 18, 1982, at D6, col. 3;
Wermiel, Engineer Groups Are Dealt Blow By High Court, Wall St. J., May 18, 1982, at 2,
col. 2.
3. Gilbert, Hydrolevel versus ASME, AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERING, Aug. 1982, at 20;
American National Standards Institute, Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in the
Hydrolevel Case, (undated) (circulated to membership); American Society for Testing and
Materials, Letter to Membership (May 24, 1982) (regarding the Hydrolevel decision); Ameri-
can Society of Mechanical Engineers, Supreme Court Holds ASME Liable in Hydrolevel
Case (May 18, 1982) (news release).
4. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 572-73.
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control is impossible. Furthermore, this article will discuss the Court's
new "altruistic" solution to "old" Sherman Act problems.
I. THE HYDROLEVEL DECISION
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") is a profes-
sional society of 9,000 members with both a full-time and a volunteer part-
time staff responsible for drafting hundreds of engineering standards used
by industry and adopted in a score of federal, state, and municipal safety
regulations. ASME assigned the task of drafting, revising, and interpret-
ing one of its standards, the prominent boiler and pressure vessel code, to a
committee which delegated public inquiries to a subcommittee under vice-
chairman John W. James, an employee of Hydrolevel's chief rival. The
boiler code, over 18,000 pages in length, is used by 46 states and Canada
and annually generates 20,000 to 30,000 public inquiries.5
Mr. James testified years later, before a United States Senate investiga-
tion, that he and his volunteer committee chairman wrote to ASME under
an assumed name, inquiring whether Hydrolevel met the code's require-
ments. The letter, cleverly written to elicit a negative interpretation, was
routinely routed by ASME's staff to the chairman, who wrote for its Secre-
tary a reply condemning products like those produced by Hydrolevel.
Hydrolevel later sued under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 6 alleg-
ing that the ASME boiler committee, and the employers of the two com-
mittee officials, conspired to misinterpret the code. ASME refused to settle
and lost the case at the trial stage. The trial judge instructed the jury,
pursuant to an ASME request, that ASME could not be liable unless it
ratified the conspirators' actions. ASME appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit7 which remanded on damages,
but affirmed liability on the basis that the conspirators acted within their
apparent authority, notwithstanding the fact that ASME never ratified nor
materially benefited. ASME then sought and was granted Supreme Court
review.
The Court, by a 6 to 3 vote, affirmed apparent authority liability, with
Chief Justice Burger affirming on actual ratification grounds. Justice
Blackmun, for the majority, found general agency liability "when ...
agents act with apparent authority and commit torts analogous to the anti-
5. Id at 559, 579.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).




trust violation presented by this case."8 He affirmed ASME's liability for
not having stopped the conspirators:
Only ASME can take systematic steps to make improper conduct
on the part of its agents unlikely, and the possibility of civil lia-
bility will inevitably be a powerful incentive for ASME to take
those steps. Thus, a rule that imposes liability on the standard-
setting organization-which is best situated to prevent antitrust
violations through the abuse of its reputation-is most faithful to
the congressional intent that the private right of action deter anti-
trust violation.9
The dissent disagreed: "application of. . . expansive rules of liability in
.. . antitrust treble damages . . . threatens serious injustice and
overdeterrence." 10
II. CONFLICT AND CONFUSION
There are a number of anomalies in Hydrolevel, reflecting the paradox
of standards themselves."' Are standards private or public? Are they com-
petitive or anticompetitive? Are they controllable under the antitrust laws?
The Supreme Court answered that standards can be developed by corpo-
rate volunteers, motivated altruistically, not competitively;' 2 that stan-
dards-setting organizations can control surreptitious ASME-like conduct,
enforcing cooperation among competitors in the public's interest; 13 and
that standards-setting, although important, can be relegated to the market-
place under Sherman Act controls.' 4
To further illustrate the nature of these questions, consider the example
of education. Education has both private and public characteristics. .It is
provided both competitively and publicly, and is controlled by our system
of laws. Education's cultural, scientific and technological benefits are pub-
8. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 565-55 (citations omitted).
9. Id at 572-73 (citation omitted).
10. Id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
11. The term "standards" (i.e., industrial standards) is generally used in this article to
include the terms "standardization," "certification," and "simplification." Standardization
usually refers to the manufacturing of uniform or identical products according to a common
design or "standard." Certification is the testing of products to determine their conformance
with a standard. Simplification is the elimination of product types or varieties according to a
standard. For further discussion of standards and their usage, see R. LEGGERT, STANDARDS
IN CANADA (1974); L. VERMAN, STANDARDIZATION (1973); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CON-
FERENCE BOARD, INDUSTRIAL STANDARDIZATION No. 85 (1957); NATIONAL STANDARDS IN
A MODERN ECONOMY (D. Reck ed. 1956); J. PERRY, THE STORY OF STANDARDS (1955); B.
MELNITSKY, PROFITING FROM INDUSTRIAL STANDARDIZATION (1953).
12. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 571.
13. Id at 572.
14. Id at 570.
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
lic, freely available and not subject to private control. Yet the personal
benefits of education-higher income, advanced social standing, and en-
hanced personal esteem-are subject to private control. If the private ben-
efit is distinguishable from the public benefit, the former will be provided
by the market under competitive controls and the latter will be provided
by the government. As in education, the standards in Hydrolevel are
mixed with both private and public characteristics benefitting industry and
affecting society. Here also, the public policy objective is to separate the
private from the public, with the former under antitrust controls and the
latter under government regulation.
Most standards today, however, are provided and controlled privately,
through organizational procedures that inevitably restrict membership,
boycott minority opposition, and inflate prices through reduced product
competition. 5 Society thus faces a difficult choice between standards pro-
vided privately through deficient internal controls and standards provided
publicly by an enlarged bureaucracy. 6
Although the Court stopped short of making any sweeping statements
about standards, 7 it did place altruistic Sherman Act controls on stan-
dards as if they were private. Yet, the Supreme Court also recognized that
volunteers "affect the destinies of businesses."'" The Court noted that
"less altruistic"'19 volunteers may harm competitors "through the manipu-
lation of. . . codes"2 and therefore may even "frustrate competition."'"
But altruism is a surprising legal standard because it conflicts with the
Court's past rulings and with what business would view as practical.
15. See D. Turner, Antitrust Aspects of Industry Cooperation and Product Standardiza-
tion, address delivered before the Briefing Conference on Fair Packaging and Labeling Act
of 1966 (May 26, 1967); D. Turner, Consumer Protection by Private Joint Action, address
delivered before the Annual Meeting of the New York State Bar (Jan. 26, 1967), reprinted in
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 36-46 (CCH) (1967); D. Turner, Com-
petition Among Competitors, address delivered before the Fifth Annual Corporate Counsel
Institute (Oct. 13, 1966).
16. See Curran, Industrial Standards, Antitrust and the Logic of Public Action: An His-
torical Searchfor a Rational Public Policy, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 717 (1978-79).
17. The Supreme Court, in this regard, did state that
We need not delineate today the outer boundaries of the antitrust liability of
standard-setting organizations for the actions of their agents committed with ap-
parent authority. . . . And in this case, we do not face a challenge to a good faith
interpretation of an ASME code reasonably supported by health or safety
considerations.
Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 577.






In the past, the Court has interpreted the Sherman Act as disallowing
conduct which is deemed "unreasonable" in the light of experience.22
Since the 1912 Standard Sanitary decision,2 3 standards may not be used to
exclude a nonstandard product in order to help fix a standard product's
price, and the Court consistently found standards illegal if used either to
fix prices or to boycott competitors. 24 Although waivering in the 1925 Ma-
ple Flooring decision,25 the Court has never deviated from its original an-
tipathy toward anticompetitive standards. In the 1961 Radiant Burners
decision,2 6 the Court struck down a standards-setting conspiracy of manu-
facturers and users for boycotting a noncertified product. Unsurprisingly,
the Court ruled most recently in Hydrolevel as it has ruled historically,
against a conspiracy between a standards group and its members. How-
ever, the Court's controlling legal standard, altruism, is obviously antithet-
22. The Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), held
that in order to be lawful agreements must only be "reasonable" under the Sherman Act,
reflecting the common law belief that encouragement of industry is in the public interest.
Later, in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), the Court
defined this "Rule-of-Reason" analysis to include:
[Wlhether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy compe-
tition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts pe-
culiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or prob-
able. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of the intent may help the court
to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id at 238.
23. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
24. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
25. In Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 566 (1925), the
Supreme Court noted: "The defendants have engaged in many activities to which no excep-
tion is taken by the Government and which are admittedly beneficial to the industry and to
consumers; such as co-operative advertising and the standardization and improvement of
the product."
26. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). This
decision protects the right of consumers to obtain the degree of product quality they choose,
rather than having that decision made for them through the unilateral agreement of produ-
cers. A congressional subcommittee noted:
The case of Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gaslight and Coke Company. . .held
a standard may not properly be used to exclude a serviceable but non-deluxe
product from the marketplace by requiring that all the manufacturers of a given
product conform to needlessly high standards. The right of the consumer to obtain
less by paying less is basic.
HousE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, THE EFFECT UPON SMALL BUSINESS OF VOL-
UNTARY INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS, H.R. REP. No. 1981, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1968) at 77.
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ical with competition.27
Altruism is an impractical guide to competitive Sherman Act behavior,
and as a result, will reduce confidence and certainty in the law. Because
the altruism standard confficts with established market incentives, it also
will confuse standards-setting organizations. The standards process, as all
market processes, must be used by business for financial gain. A business
simply cannot afford to sublimate its profit needs, to ignore its natural
competitive instincts, and to loan volunteers without regard to these funda-
mental commercial needs. Thus, neither employers nor their volunteers
can meet the Court's historic competitive imperative and simultaneously
develop noncompetitive standards cooperatively for all society. It is un-
clear whether corporations and volunteers can deny commercial realities.
Nevertheless, since Hydrolevel they must attempt to serve the public self-
lessly in accord with the Court's new awareness of the "opportunities for
anticompetitive activity."'2 8
Contrary to the Court's view, altruistic controls are not the answer. Be-
cause the Court has never condoned anticompetitive standards, appear-
ances of due care and propriety--even if controls are illusory-are now
very important.
III. ANTITRUST CONTROLS
Because standards impact upon all society, they affect markets and
prices. As a result, standards are inevitably anticompetitive and can be
illegal.29 Since the antitrust laws govern private conduct, they cannot
wholly eliminate these public effects, visible to a skilled antitrust investiga-
tor who need only analyze markets and prices and interview frustrated
competitors.3" If uncovered, anticompetitive effects cannot be explained as
"reasonably" ancillary to a lawful health or safety purpose, since the Court
ruled in Professional Engineers that competition may not be restrained to
abate a public safety nuisance.3 But without a health or safety objective,
27. See generally T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970).
28. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 571.
29. The antitrust implications of standards are discussed in few scholarly reviews. The
few, beside those cited in supra notes 15 & 16, include: Timberlake, Standardization and
Simplication Under the Anti-trust Laws, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 301 (1944); Wachtel, Product
Standards and Certgication Programs, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1968); Blecher, Product Stan-
dards and Certification Programs, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 223 (1980).
30. See generally Hummel, Antitrust Problems of Industry Codes of Advertising, Stand-
ardization, and Seals ofApproval, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 607, 610-14 (1968).
31. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Justice
Stevens noted therein:
Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially dangerous goods and services would
[Vol. 33:147
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a standard's purpose becomes strictly commercial. Altruism, therefore, re-
quires something more than a high-minded social objective or a punctili-
ous due process record.
Due process, whether procedural or substantive,3 z cannot remedy the
deficiencies detected by the Court in Hydrolevel. Although it does limit
competitive foreclosure, a due process format of notice, consultation, pub-
lic debate, voting, and appeals stifles dissent with majority commercial in-
terests dominating oppositional interests. An altruistic solution to the due
process conundrum would be a rule, not majoritarian, with single dissent-
ing interests controlling. Obviously diluting standards, a rule of unanim-
ity33 would, however, eliminate most exclusion, so long as all interested
public and private parties were represented. Even then, substantively cor-
rect standards will affect product performance and deter future technical
improvement, delaying research and development. Corporations produc-
ing a standardized product will have no incentive to research ways around
the rule, rendering it obsolete. Their adherence to the standard will raise
antitrust issues over the future loss of competition for innovative and im-
proved products. The only altruistic control against subverted research
would be a public monitor of all scientific and technological developments.
However, since industrial research is private and conducted secretly, it
would have to be made public, exposing technical achievements, and cre-
ating an additional Sherman Act risk by distorting the race for a better
product.
Certifying a product's qualities is also troublesome.3 4 A certification is
be tantamount to repeal of the statute. In our complex economy the number of
items that may cause serious harm is almost endless-automobiles, drugs, foods,
aircraft components, heavy equipment, and countless others, cause serious harm to
individuals or to the public at large if defectively made. The judiciary cannot indi-
rectly protect the public against harm by conferring monopoly privileges on the
manufacturers.
Id. at 695-96.
32. Courts, applying the Rule-of-Reason discussed supra note 22, to associations
promulgating standards, have approved association decisions that comply with basic re-
quirements of procedural and substantive fairness. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Ex-
change, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d
781 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Gunter Harz Sports v. Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.
1981); Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980); Hatley v.
American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977);. See also Note, TradeAssocia-
lion Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Rolefor the Rule ofReason, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1486 (1966); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 247-53 (1977).
33. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
34. See generally Hoffman, Industry-Wide Codes, Advertising, Seals of Approval and
Standards: As Participated in by the Trade Association, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 595 (1968);
Hummell, supra note 30. But see Howe & Badger, The Antitrust Challenge to Nonprofit Certi-
fication Organizations, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 357 (1982).
19831
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believed safe if voluntary, without mandatory features. As a practical mat-
ter, compliance with a certification program can become mandatory over
time as participants cease production of similar but noncertifiable prod-
ucts, thereby choking off cheaper products and those denied certification.
Moreover, laboratories testing for certification are not always independent,
test results are not always confidential, and competitors managing the pro-
gram are not always denied access to records. 31 In the long run, a labora-
tory's effectiveness may be determined by the number of products denied
certification, not by whether it administered a certification program objec-
tively and fairly. In addition, because procedural costs are borne by the
certified members, they will continue the program only if commercially
(and competitively) successful. Thus, every refusal to certify will have dif-
ficult competitive implications, possibly raising inferences of "bad intent"
as in Structural Laminates.36 Even if altruistic controls and tests could be
devised, reconsideration must be offered a product which fails, as well as
full appeal rights and access to equivalent tests. Obviously, such altruism
would be alien to a rigidly scientific test, but not to a test accommodating
new products immediately eligible for certification. Once certified, they
may not influence the program's future scientific design and the eligibility
of successive generations of products. Can a certification program be
designed which is totally voluntary, nonmandatory and actually open to
every product?
Altruistic controls are obviously impractical. Nonetheless, organizations
have little choice but to approximate the controls envisioned by the Court,
adopting more stringent management systems and more rigorous due pro-
cess procedures. Typically, organizations will attempt to control those
who may act on their behalf. They will dictate who has the authority to
sign letters and distribute materials, who are their policymaking officials
35. The problem with testing a laboratory's independence is illustrated by Howe &
Badger:
Over one thousand private sector laboratories perform testing and services related
to certification. Many of the laboratories are affiliated with third-party certification
programs sponsored and administered by nonprofit certification organizations or
trade associations, often with public interest representatives. In addition, numer-
ous inhouse manufacturers' laboratories, as well as nonprofit entities such as Un-
derwriters Laboratories and various commercial entities, also engage in
certification testing. Those resulting types of certification, however, lead to repre-
sentations of certification status either by the manufacturers without the involve-
ment of industry-wide, third-party administrative bodies or by the laboratories
rather than the manufacturers.
Howe & Badger, supra note 34, at 397-98.
36. Structural Laminates Inc. v. Doulas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore.
1966), af'd, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
[Vol. 33:147
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and what are their policy procedures, what are their members' authority
limits and antitrust obligations and who has access to official letterhead
and can make ad hoc advisory and interpretive opinions. Organizations
heeding the Court's admonition that "antitrust violations . . . could not
have occurred without ...AMSE's method of administ[ration]," '37 will
disseminate mandatory membership directives prohibiting conflicts of in-
terest and delineating responsibilities and obligations and control mem-
bers' access to organizational resources in order to limit misconduct.
Organizations will dutifully investigate antitrust infractions vigorously
and not "whitewash" inappropriate conduct as a courtesy to a committee
officer as in Hydrolevel.3 8  Such controls will improve the detection
probability of misconduct and will eliminate invidious conspiracies. Addi-
tionally, future litigation will be avoided by balancing committees with
both private and public representatives, not unbalancing them with parti-
san industry officials, and by requiring full committee approval of all inter-
pretations. Organizations will attempt what the Court directed: that
volunteers not be cloaked with expedient authority, and that private inter-
ests not conflict with the public interest.
Yet skulduggery will occur even in closely controlled organizations.39
Practically speaking, no organization can control shrewd members intent
upon competitive sabotage because the opportunities for clandestine con-
duct are too great.' ° Corporations advisedly select employees as volun-
teers from engineering, health, and safety and not from sales and
marketing. This simple precaution, like other customary controls, may or
may not eliminate misconduct depending on corporate management's cost
consciousness. Nonsales personnel may have to compromise their profes-
sionalism in order to achieve cost-effectiveness, thereby interjecting poten-
tially dangerous commercial considerations into a standard's development.
And if professionals do not participate directly, avoiding both meetings
and voting, they will still be vulnerable as would be their corporate em-
ployers. Risks cannot be eliminated by simply eschewing roll-calls, and by
relying on secondhand minutes and "discrete" phone reports. The degree
of participation does not guarantee a propitious legal outcome because
37. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 576.
38. Id at 572.
39. See generally Lane, Trade and Professional Associations: Ethics and Standards, 46
ABA ANTITRUST L. J. 653 (1978).
40. ASME knows the practical problems of controlling anticompetitive behavior based
on a 1970 Justice Department action for refusing to inspect and certify foreign-manufac-
tured boilers. ASME discontinued the practice and agreed with the Department to inspect
all boilers regardless of origin. United States v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc.,
No. 70 Civ. 3141 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1972); 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,028 at 92,256.
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even nominal participation can be dangerous. However, corporations can
participate safely in federally sponsored and mandated programs. 41 If ac-
tually compelled, participation can be immune from antitrust attack; but
participants should not abuse the legislative, judicial or regulatory
processes of the government for anticompetitive ends.42
Of course, corporate counsel will attempt to counter opportunities for
felonious conduct by reviewing the organization, by scrutinizing its char-
ter, by-laws and statement of goals and purposes, by insisting on strong
antitrust and strict due process policies and by determining the organiza-
tion's commitment to technical excellence and procedural integrity. But
even these precautions are worth little if counsel fails routinely to review
each standard's purpose and objective. Since standards are competitively
sensitive, counsel should require justification for them at each stage of de-
velopment from initial formulation to implementation and ultimately
through interpretation. Each stage must stand alone and be able to with-
stand separate close scrutiny. If counsel's analysis reveals flaws, an organi-
zation cannot be absolved of antitrust responsibility because of its part-
time staffs "volunteer" status or its own "non-profit" charter. 'Whether
utilizing volunteers, or chartered nonprofit organization, an organization
developing an industrial standard immediately loses all prospect of anti-
trust immunity.43
Some obvious misconduct can be thwarted by traditional antitrust meas-
ures including strict due process procedures. However, these customary
controls, even if strengthened, do not guarantee altruistic conduct. Orga-
nizations, through new controls, must actually change their character, not
merely watch the development, usage, and interpretation of standards
more closely. Organizations must depend less on corporate volunteers.
41. It should be noted that participation in nonmandated government standards would
not immunize private parties from the antitrust laws. Recent Supreme Court decisions, such
as Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976); and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) have reaffirmed
this principle established earlier by the Court in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940) and Federal Trade Comm'n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
See generaly' Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of
Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEXAs L. REV. 1329 (1978).
42. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Confer-
ence v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
43. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
(upholding a Sherman Act complaint against a professional engineering society); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (upholding a Sherman
Act complaint against the American Gas Association); Associated Press v. United States,




They cannot allow the volunteer to manage committees and must relegate
them to technical research. Organizations will not likely change their indi-
vidualistic character and become purely altruistic, but less drastic changes
will only diminish, not eliminate, the risk of antitrust liability arising from
corporate volunteer management.
Thus limiting private participation will not eliminate antitrust risks pro-
portionately. Conniving volunteers can still work minor escapades,
though now relegated to "technical" research. Indeed, research may be
more important, and more sensitive, than the management of committees.
Undoubtedly, full-time managers can be fooled technically, not having the
range of scientific expertise of volunteers working in the field. Moreover,
major social damage can occur as corporations importune organizations to
develop standards, even if based on solid technical data, hoping to achieve
anticompetitive results. If such standards are adopted, it is possible that
the law will be violated by the corporations either in concert with the or-
ganization or by the corporations only. But what about an unwitting or-
ganization? Was not ASME unwitting, although careless? Since the
Hydrolevel decision, dare any organization insulate itself with anything
less than safeguards against casual business alliances?
If organizations must change their character and identity substantially,
perhaps the renunciation of all corporate influence is the answer. As a
practical matter, there are few alternative private organizations: only in-
dependent foundations and academic organizations come to mind. Either
could theoretically develop standards without Hydrolevel complications,
but probably not as efficiently as with corporate financial backing. But is a
plethora of privately financed organizations churning out standards a ra-
tional social goal?
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
This brings us to an important point: the eminent practicality of inter-
nal corporate standards. It is difficult to envisage circumstances that an
internal corporate program could not handle. It is equally difficult since
Hydrolevel to understand why a corporation sensitive to escalating legal
costs and increasing liability, would not cut industrial standards from its
budget and devise its own safety and quality programs at a fraction of the
cost. If there were overriding commercial considerations, a corporation
could still "jawbone" publicly outside the typical standards forum. Ad-
dressing the public directly, the corporation is doing nothing more than
promoting a recommended course of action which society, industry and
users could then accept or reject.
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
This is the market system at its best-society, users, and customers sig-
nalling their preferences to producers-and absolutely antitrust clean un-
less, of course, the producers signal each other directly. A producer must
accept the market's decision as final, not seek a competitive response
before initiating a product or process modification. In the past, producers
may have used the standards system to achieve competitive parity or a cost
equilibrium, but it would not be prudent for them to use standards as an
indirect way to coordinate industrial action. As a general rule, if a pro-
ducer has a superior product, or cost-efficient process, it should exploit its
advantage rather than raise antitrust concerns by "helping" its industry.
Yet, was competition in this time-tested "classical" sense rejected by the
Court in Hydrolevel?
Historically, the Court has extolled "hard" Sherman Act competition
between antagonistic business interests in order to further the public's in-
terests.44 Does altruism, therefore, signal a departure from the past? Has
the Court modified the nineteenth century Sherman Act to solve contem-
porary economic problems, requiring cooperation rather than old-line
competitive solutions? Could this be the reason for the controversy?
Traditionally, business (and the Court) has rejected collective solutions
on ideological "free enterprise" grounds. However, there is historical pre-
cedent for a collective effort in the form of an independent commission
financed publicly and comprised of existing standards organizations,
tightly controlled without autonomous authority. The nation's War Indus-
tries Boards eliminated duplicate and unnecessary goods and equipment
during both World Wars, preserving essentials for the nation's defense.45
Of course the times were different, but the concept and potential accom-
plishments of a collective and unified effort would be no less valid or tan-
44. The Supreme Court's classic statement on competition and the Sherman Act is suc-
cinctly stated in Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958):
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic lib-
erty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social
institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally
laid down by the Act is competition. And to this end it prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States." Although this prohibition is literally all-encompassing, the courts
have construed it as precluding only those contracts or combinations which "un-
reasonably" restrain competition.
Id (quoting Chicago Bd of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) and Standard Oil Co
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
45. See R. CUFF, THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD (1973).
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gible today. Whatever the final form and structure, present organizations
will necessarily change. They will exercise greater hierarchical control and
affect the quantity and quality of standards, as well as their interpretation
and certification. The point is not whether change will come, but whether
the social and legal demands for change can be anticipated so that a trans-
formation can evolve smoothly. Perhaps the Supreme Court understands
the need for slowly evolving change and Hydrolevel is its first signal.
Accordingly, standards-setting organizations might well consider a
planned approach, bringing together industry, government, and labor4 6 to
standardize products and processes with little to fear from traditional anti-
trust. The Court in Hydrolevel has provocatively set forth a possible thesis
for solving economic problems intractable under the old ways and meth-
ods of thinking.
This is not to say that a "new thesis" will pervade other antitrust areas in
the future, but the possibilities for change do exist. Better coordination
between producers and distributors is a distinct possibility. 47 Coordinated
joint research ventures and export amalgamations are already realities,
and a global economic model may possibly eclipse the "perfectly" compet-
itive model of a bygone era. Indeed, the Court has already hinted at a
new, more realistic world economic model,48 but in other recent deci-
sions49 has preserved older competitive rules making compliance difficult.
Inconsistencies will evaporate over time as Hydrolevel's new, coordinated
antitrust approach becomes either a blueprint for the nation's economic
future or an aberration. Perhaps though, it signals more fundamental
change.
V. RESOLUTION
The complexity of Hydrolevel reflects the remarkably varied history of
industrial standards; now a history of approximately 400 private organiza-
tions and 20,000 standards.50 Depending upon your perspective, these
large numbers are either a tribute to the nation's economic vitality,
strength and diversity or a condemnation of it for never unifying standards
46. See R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983).
47. See Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983).
48. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
49. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
50. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT
TRADE PRODUCT STANDARDS: A PRIMER FOR CONSUMERS PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
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under a single coherent policy. Legal history provides some evidence that
this diversity has diminished welfare with wasted technical and industrial
resources. Standards have been attacked by Washington enforcement
agencies for stabilizing prices, boycotting competitors and retarding new
products and process improvements.51 Perhaps enforcement does not al-
ways follow retarded technological progress, but it is a possibility. Why in
a trillion-dollar economy do some industries employ standards and others
not?
Standards are probably more prevalent in "sunset" industries, ap-
proaching the end of their products' life cycles. Standards can slow down
the pace of product decay by retarding competitive product alternatives,
and by alleging health and safety risks.52 The collective interests of ma-
ture industries, therefore, conflict with the interests of society. Society's
more prevalent interests emphasize change and relentless progress seem-
ingly without regard for the cost to industry. Such consequences are at-
tributable to the free market's "creative destruction. '5 3
A national public program 54 would not be plagued with conflicts of in-
terests, and could certainly formulate standards using fewer resources than
the 400 existing organizations, their redundant staffs and expensive corpo-
rate volunteers. Limiting standards to the government is not a new propo-
sal,55 but it is a sound one. Society only grants monopolies through the
government, why not standards? They are, after all, monopolies, with pri-
vate interests conferring unique privileges on one other, outside public
51. See generally Curran, supra note 16.
52. Economist John Blair claims that corporations may eschew technological progress
for a variety of reasons, including the "desire to protect the investment in an older technol-
ogy." J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION 228 (1972).
53. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3rd ed. 1947).
Schumpeter stated further, that the most important competition is "the competition from the
new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization
...." Id at 84.
54. The opportunity for antitrust harm was recognized by United States Senator James
Abourezk, D-S.D., upon introducing in 1977 a bill to control standards organizations
federally:
I do not quarrel with [standards] groups getting together. . . because standards
...play an important role in a highly technical, industrial society. . . .But, all
too often our procedures for setting standards yield precisely the opposite results.
Product standards . . . are unquestionably among today's most convenient
modes for restraining trade and deceiving customers.
123 CONG. REC. 5543 (1977).
55. See Turner, supra note 15; Curran, supra note 16. Ralph Nader also expresses the
view that standards are a government function and he therefore believes that government
should refrain from giving any support to voluntary standards setting processes. See Cur-




scrutiny. So characterized they are illegal, ending their defacto Sherman
Act exemption. Industry can well prosper by campaigning lawfully and
collectively for government standards within existing Supreme Court
guidelines.
How sound is this idea? Have not industrial standards produced some
salutary results? What about increased health and safety? Under any crit-
ical social analysis these results would appear fortuitous at best. Having to
accommodate so many diverse self-interests, the present standards-setting
process cannot also accommodate the public's interest. Such a process can
easily become a coalition either absorbed or isolated by dominant private
interests. In Hydrolevel, for example, the boiler code was easily manipu-
lated by the conspirators. Predictably, the Court found their egregious
conduct illegal. Because they are so susceptible to misuse, the Court did
not, however, explain why standards should be legal under the Sherman
Act. In fact, some commentators believe all standards are anticompetitive
because of their exclusionary and price effects.56 Other commentators,
57
however, advocate the Court's 1963 Silver5" teachings that standards are
legal if used and interpreted through accepted due process procedures.
They believe Silver protects the interests of society generally, but never
question how the public's diverse interests can be protected by procedures
ultimately controlled by private interests controlling the organizations as
well.
For example, ASME's boiler code effectiveness was disputed by
Hydrolevel which attributed over 100 major boiler failures in one year to
code design flaws and contended its product was a significant technological
improvement.59 This is not surprising, considering the following candid
revelation by one conspirator:
A major reason for [our success is a result of our] efforts and skill
in influencing the various code making bodies to "legislate" in
favor of [our] products. This has been a planned strategy for the
business . . . and carried out with considerable success as evi-
denced by the market penetration of 70 plus %.60
If the government were to identify a public course of action, industry
could then advise and assist in the formulation and development of a stan-
dard-as long as important decisions were not relegated to private decision
makers. Since only the government can decide what constitutes a proper
56. Turner, supra note 15; Curran, supra note 16.
57. Wachtel, supra note 29; Howe & Badger, supra note 34.
58. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
59. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 571 n.8.
60. Id
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and equitable standard, Congress should establish an executive agency-
like the Patent Office-to write and certify standards. This would resolve
the paradox of standards and their conflict with the antitrust laws and a
free enterprise economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since standards-setting organizations play an "important role in the
economy ' 6' wielding "great power,"'62 the Supreme Court in Hydrolevel
applied the threat of antitrust treble damages to "deter future violations"
63
by these "extragovernmental agencies."64 Criticized as an "un-
precendent[ed] theory of antitrust liability,, 65 Hydrolevel has created sub-
stantial problems for the nation's many standards organizations relying on
volunteer corporate employees. Since volunteer misconduct cannot be
controlled effectively,66 organizations must develop and interpret stan-
dards through their full-time staffs, free of the conflicts plaguing volunteer
corporate employees. Organizations must also find alternative funding
sources, eliminating the last vestiges of private controlling interests. Since
the only other source is public, the character of private organizations will
transform. The antitrust risk will then subside, but not dissipate, until
standards are either mandated or developed by the federal government.
Whatever form organizations eventually take, Hydrolevel portends a
change for privately devised standards and exposes the myth of the altruis-
tic corporate employee volunteering, but not profiteering, in the public's
interest.
61. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556, 577.
62. Id. at 570.
63. Id. at 575.
64. The Supreme Court in Hydroleiel observed: ASME can be said to be "in reality an
extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of inter-
state commerce." Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 570 (quoting Fashion Originator's Guild of Am.,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941)).
65. Id. at 578.
66. The Federal Trade Commission recommends a trade regulation rule requiring stan-
dards-setting organizations to consider and promptly decide complaints about unreasonable
restraints of trade. Presumably, such a rule would have forestalled the Hydrolevel "skuldug-
gery," but will not cure the fundamental flaws inherent in standards, as well as in their
formulation and development processes, and only underscores the need for more basic re-
form. See Federal Trade Comm'n, Standards and Certqication, FINAL STAFF REP. (April
1983).
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